Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at … of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at … of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two different situations which allow for a variation of responder veto … compared to the dictator game is (marginally) smaller when the proposer is in the superior information position. Further we …

We analyze the effects of asymmetric information concerning the size of a pie on proposer behavior in three different … bargaining situations: the ultimatum game, the Yes-No-game and the dictator game. Our data show that (a) irrespective of the … information condition, proposer generosity increases with responder veto power, (b) informed proposers in the ultimatum game try …

does not. Before the buyer decides how many units to purchase, the seller can disclose verifiable information about the … good. The better the information, the more the buyer is inclined to buy. The information about the good is two …, but unaware of the second. Here, unawareness refers to a lack of conception rather than lack of information. In the …

laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant … effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences …

laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant … effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences …

laboratory experiment we test the different theories by systematically varying information conditions. We find significant … effects of seemingly innocent changes in information. Moreover, the generalized imitation model predicts the differences …

We experimentally investigate how different information about others' individual contributions affects conditional … cooperators' willingness to cooperate in a one-shot linear public goods game. We find that when information about individual … contributions is provided, contributions are generally higher than when only average information is available. This effect is …