We consider two players facing identical discrete-time bandit problems with a safe and a risky arm. In any period, the risky arm yields either a success or a failure, and the first success reveals the risky arm to dominate the safe one. When payoffs are public information, the ensuing free-rider...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

We study a two-player dynamic investment model with information externalities and provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a unique switching equilibrium. Within this setup, we ask whether policymakers should interfere when better informed agents make individual investment decisions. We...

This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. We find that equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible...