The appendices for this paper are available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164774" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2164774Many markets without repeated seller-buyer relations feature third-party "monitors" that sell recommendations. We analyze the profit-maximizing recommendation...

We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are...

As addressing climate change becomes a high priority it seems likely that there will be a surge in interest in deploying nuclear power. Other fuel bases are too dirty (coal), too expensive (oil, natural gas) or too speculative (solar, wind) to completely supply the energy needs of the global...

This paper challenges recent results on the fragility of the value of commitment. It introduces a specific notion of the 'value of information' for a later-moving player about the action choice of a previously-moving player, gives conditions under which this value is positive and shows that a...

We show that product differentiation reduces the informativeness of a firm's stock price (or its peers' stock prices) about the value of its growth opportunities. This results in less efficient exercise of a firm's growth options when managers rely on information in stock prices for their...

The well-known Blackwell's theorem states the equivalence of statistical informativeness and economic valuableness. Celen (2012) generalizes this theorem, which is well-known for subjective expected utility (SEU), to maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences. We demonstrate that the underlying...

One apparent reason for deferring a decision – abstaining from choosing, leaving the decision open to be taken by someone else, one’s later self, or nature – is for lack of sufficient confidence in the relevant beliefs. This paper develops an axiomatic theory of decision in situations...

We study optimal disclosure via two competing communication channels; hard information whose value has been verified and soft disclosures such as forecasts, unaudited statements and press releases. We show that certain soft disclosures may contain as much information as hard disclosures, and we...

Prediction (or information) markets are markets where participants trade contracts whose payoff depends on unknown future events. Studying prediction markets allows to avoid many problems, which arise in some artificially designed behavioral experiments investigating collective decision making...

This paper studies the effects of the signal available before a standard Baron-Myerson contracting takes place. It shows that, while the principal's profits increase with the quality of the signal, the agent's rent also increases if the signal concerns the realizations where the principal is...