We study a dynamic buyer-seller problem in which the good is information and there are no property rights. The potential buyer is reluctant to pay for information whose value to him is uncertain, but the seller cannot credibly convey its value to the buyer without disclosing the information...

In a binary prediction market in which risk-neutral traders have heterogeneous prior beliefs and are allowed to invest a limited amount of money, the static rational expectations equilibrium price is demonstrated to underreact to information. This effect is consistent with a favorite-longshot...

This paper examines a class of signaling games with multi-dimensional private information to study how the prior, joint distribution of the private information variables affect a signal's effectiveness in revealing information about these variables. To illustrate the general problem investigated...

This paper studies information orders in screening models with quasilinear preferences. I amend a general screening problem with a public signal about the agent's type and provide robust rankings of signals from the principal's perspective. The principal prefers one signal to another for any...

Many transactions in the marketplace rely on hard (or verifiable) information about the underlying value of the intended exchange, typically through certification--- housing, diamonds, bonds being cases in point. What is the class of Pareto efficient certifications for such scenarios? This paper...

The study examines how the lack of comparable public peers (“informational uniqueness”) is related to a firm's disclosure policy and information environment. Having less information spillover from other public firms may present an information deficiency if it is not compensated by other...

In this paper I studied the optimal mechanism in selling information to decision makers with private prior knowledge about the payoff relevant state. When the underlying decision problem has a continuum of actions, the optimal mechanism will be a continuum menu of experiments with decreasing...

A principal hires an agent to acquire costly information that will influence the decision of a third party. While the realized piece of information is observable and contractible, the experimental process is not. Assuming a general family of information cost functions (inclusive of Shannon's...

Credence goods markets are characterized by pronounced informational asymmetries between consumers and expert sellers. As a consequence, consumers are often exploited and market efficiency is threatened. However, in the digital age, it has become easy and cheap for consumers to self-diagnose...

After the close of an auction, the winning bidder may find that he is unable to carry out his bid offer. This paper seeks to determine what measures the seller should take to maximize his share of the surplus when bidders are privately informed about their risk of default. Special attention is...