We examine the voluntary disclosure behavior of peer firms of hostile takeover targets. We find that peer firms under control threat use a disclosure strategy that emphasizes bad news: they provide more bad news forecasts, tend to bundle bad news forecasts with earnings announcements, use more...

The significance and the manipulative nature of related-party transactions (RPTs) render transparent disclosure necessary and relevant for investors who infer firm value from accounting disclosures. However, the full disclosure of RPTs may not be cost effective because not all of the information...

Using textual analysis methods, we investigate the information content of government financial disclosure and its implications. Specifically, we establish several stylized facts using the comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) issued by municipal entities. We first document large...

Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors...

Prior studies use fundamental earnings forecasts to proxy for the market's expectations of earnings because analyst forecasts are biased and are available for only a subset of firms. We find that as a proxy for market expectations, fundamental forecasts contain systematic measurement errors...

This paper studies the relationship between firms' corporate governance quality and information content of stock trades. Following Hasbrouck (1991) method, a trade's information content is defined as persistent impact of trade innovation on stock price. Using firm-level governance data, we show...

We explore the relation between corporate governance and the informational efficiency of prices (IEP). We find that IEP increases with the quality of corporate governance in a large cross-section of firms. We show that firms with better governance structures file Form 8-K reports more promptly...

We examine whether and to what extent managers are evaluated, in their relative performance contracts, on the basis of systematic performance. Focusing on relative total shareholder returns (rTSR), the predominant metric specified in these contracts and used by market participants to evaluate...

When there is high information asymmetry between directors and managers, independent directors do not have enough information to perform their functions. Only when faced with a good internal information environment can such directors acquire enough information to provide advice and monitor...