We study how information affects equilibria and welfare in games. For an agent, more precise information about an … obtain either a non-increasing mean or a non-decreasing-mean spread of actions whenever information precision increases for … environments. In persuasion games, we derive sufficient conditions that lead to extremal disclosure of information. In …

theory of information that allows us to characterize the information preferences of decision-makers based on how their … higher values of the signal are realized. We show how this restriction can be exploited to characterize information … information than another decision-maker, and thus will acquire more information. The results are applied to oligopoly models …

(MEU) preferences. We demonstrate that the underlying definition of the value of information used in Celen (2012) is in …. Our main contribution consists in the definition of a value of information for MEU preferences that is compatible with …

information asymmetry, is undertaken, and a simple multi-factor model of deferral – involving both confidence and information …

. We show that this is equivalent to a constrained information design problem, and characterize its solution. Moreover, we … use a novel result on the comparison of information structures to show that the simple geometric mechanism is optimal …

sophisticated MEU preferences are then used to analyze the value of information under ambiguity; a basic trade-off between … information acquisition and commitment is highlighted. …

The standard Bayesian model implies that information can never have a negative value. We put this implication to the … proof. Our paper provides the first test of the value (positive or negative) of information under uncertainty. We show that … the "Bayesian implication" stands in conflict with the information-averse behavior that is revealed in our experiment …

, alongside the products' prices. Furthermore, we study how consumers integrate the usage of ratings with other information … provided from other sources. Halfway through the experiment, we provide information regarding the underlying value behind the … ratings. Using a between-subject design, we modify the information provided and analyze the impact of such information on the …