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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001647226
The collection of information necessary for decision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats, advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision have to be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of a single agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014120210
The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. The reason is that two conflicting pieces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011326399
We study committees that acquire information, deliberate and vote. A member cares about state-dependent decision payoffs and about his reputation for expertise. The state remains unobserved, even after the decision has been taken. In such inconclusive environments, in equilibrium, a member's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012898263
We study a model of collective decision making with endogenous information collection. Agents collect information about the consequences of a project, communicate, and then vote on the project. We examine under what conditions communication may increase the probability that good decisions are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067953
A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067970
This article is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision making processes in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information. Committees improve the quality of decision making by providing information and by coordinating the collection of information. We address...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029163
In models of sequential decision making herd behaviour occurs if the signals smart (dumb) agents receive are (un)correlated and if agents have reputational concerns. We show that introducing costly effort to become informed about project payoffs (i) eliminates herd behaviour and (ii) shifts...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031097
This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-making processes in a world where agents must be motivated to collect information. Committees improve the quality of decision-making by providing information and by coordinating the collection of information. We address...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031355
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013533270