In the seminal rational inattention model of Matĕjka and McKay (2015), logit demand arises from the discrete choice of agents who are uncertain about choice payoffs and have access to a flexible, costly information acquisition technology (RI-logit). A notable limitation of this powerful...

In the seminal rational inattention model of Matĕjka and McKay (2015), logit demand arises from the discrete choice of agents who are uncertain about choice payoffs and who have access to a flexible, costly information acquisition technology (RI-logit). A notable limitation of this powerful...

In the seminal rational inattention model of Matêjka and McKay (2015), logit demand arises from the discrete choice of agents who are uncertain about choice payoffs and who have access to a flexible, costly information acquisition technology (RI-logit). A notable limitation of this powerful...

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...

In this paper we show that subtle forms of deceit undermine the effectiveness of incentives. We design an experiment in which the principal has an interest in underreporting the true performance difference between the agents in a dynamic tournament. According to the standard approach, rational...