We introduce a model of asymmetric competition where two network operators with different investment costs may build an internet access infrastructure and where a virtual operator provides services through third-party access. We show that the virtual operator requests access from the low cost...

In this paper we study the effect of the terms of access to an incumbent's infrastructure on an entrant's incentives to build its own infrastructure. Setting a high level of access (e.g., a resale arrangement), which requires relatively small up-front investment for entry, accelerates market...

In this paper we study an entrant’s incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent’s infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step...

In the telecommunications industry, the ladder-of-investment approach claims that service-based competition (when entrants lease access to incumbents' facilities) can serve as a “stepping stone” for facility-based entry (when entrants build their own infrastructures to provide services). In...

In this paper we study an entrant's incentives to build a network infrastructure, when there is an initial phase of service-based competition where it leases access to the incumbent's infrastructure. We build a model in which the phase of service-based competition allows the entrant to step into...