Dynamic game with changing leader is studied on the example of R&D co-opetition structure. The leader benefits from higher followers' innovations rate and followers are enjoying a spillover from the leader. Leadership changes because of asymmetric efficiency of investments of players. It is...

Innovations in consumer products frequently rely on technological advances across multiple tiers in a supply chain. Considering the consumer market demand and downstream investment conditions as input, we model a game in a two-tier supply chain where downstream firms choose to adopt different...

This paper analyses the effects on economic agents' behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an...

This paper analyses the effects on economic agents' behaviour of an innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Administration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to the tourists an...

We propose a stylised dynamic model to understand the role of social networks in the phenomenon we call "globalization." This term refers to the process by which even agents who are geographically far apart come to interact, thus being able to overcome what would otherwise be a fast saturation...

Modifying a parallel dynamic programming approach to a simple deterministic economy, we consider the effect of an innovation in the means of production. The success of the innovation is assumed to depend on the availability of financing, locus of financial control, the amount of resources...

We study a Cournot duopoly where firms can decide to incur fixed costs in activities that improve their competitiveness (i.e. product development or process innovation). Innovation costs generate discontinuities in the firms' quantity best response functions and, in turn, a variety of...

This paper studies optimal contest design for competitive experimentation. The principal seeks contributions from multiple agents whose experimentation efforts are unobservable. To induce effort, the contest must provide agents with an information rent that increases in the duration of the...