Firms and governments spend billions of dollars on R&D every year. To increase social welfare, the results of R&D must be commercialized so that consumers can benefit from improved products and lower prices. One measure of R&D output is patents; however, most patent databases contain no...

We study the causal impact of invalidating marginally valid patents during post-grant opposition at the European Patent Office on affected inventors' subsequent patenting. We exploit exogenous variation in invalidation by leveraging the participation of a patent's original examiner in the...

We study the causal impact of invalidating marginally valid patents during post-grant opposition at the European Patent Office on affected inventors' subsequent patenting. We exploit exogenous variation in invalidation by leveraging the participation of a patent's original examiner in the...

Licensing is one of the major sources of international technology transfer to developing countries. This paper clarifies how strengthening intellectual property rights (IPRs) affect innovation and licensing by making use of a quality-ladder type of dynamic general equilibrium model. We explore...

This paper examines the long-run effects of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection and industrial policies on innovation and technology transfer using a North-South quality ladder model where licensing is the main mode of technology transfer to developing countries. We show that the...

In the 1990s, patenting schemes changed in many respects: upcoming new technologies accelerated the shift from price competition towards competition based on technical inventions, a worldwide surge in patenting took place, and the ‘patent thicket’ arose as a consequence of strategic...

We show that when the researcher’s (observable but not contractible) contribution <p> to innovation is crucial, a covenant not to compete (CNC) reduces e.ort and profits <p> under both spot and relational contracts. Having no CNC allows the researcher to <p> leave for a rival. This alleviates a...</p></p></p>

The prize system for innovation has been criticized as impractical due to the lack of a workable formula or algorithm to determine the size of prizes. In this paper, a decentralized market mechanism via the intertemporal bounty (IB) system can function to duplicate Pareto optimality. Under this...