The literature on license auctions for process innovations in oligopoly assumed that the auctioneer reveals the winning …, partial, and no disclosure of bids, which correspond to standard auctions. We show that more information disclosure increases …

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to … those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost …

scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe … imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal strength … of combining auctions and royalty contracts for losers. …

. We propose a new mechanism that combines a restrictive license auction with royalty licensing. This mechanism is more … profitable than standard license auctions, auctioning royalty contracts, fixed-fee licensing, pure royalty licensing, and two …-part tariffs. The key features are that royalty contracts are auctioned and that losers of the auction are granted the option to …

oligopoly. We propose a new mechanism that combines elements of a license auction with royalty licensing by granting the losers … of the auction the option to sign a royalty contract. The optimal new mechanism eliminates the losses from exclusionary … licensing without reducing bidders' surplus; therefore, it is more profitable than both standard license auctions and pure …

We consider a licensing mechanism for process innovations that combines a license auction with royalty contracts to … those who lose the auction. Firms' bids are dual signals of their cost reductions: the winning bid signals the own cost …

scheme that combines a first-price license auction with royalty contracts for losers. Prior to bidding firms observe … imperfect signals of the expected cost reduction; after the auction the winning bid is made public. Bidders may signal strength … of combining auctions and royalty contracts for losers. …

suppliers. We also compare other common contests, in particular, fixed-prize tournaments and auctions. Like bonus tournaments …, auctions implement the socially optimal diversity, but usually with higher rents for the suppliers. Fixed-prize tournaments … implement insufficient diversity, but may nevertheless be preferred by the buyer to auctions because of lower supplier rents. …