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In this paper we construct a model in which entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as exacerbated development by better-informed venture-backed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012719493
This paper constructs a model where entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We first show that aggressive development of a basic innovation by better informed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014048096
In this paper we construct a model in which entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as exacerbated development by better-informed venture-backed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419514
In this paper we construct a model in which entrepreneurial innovations are sold into oligopolistic industries and where adverse selection problems between entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and incumbents are present. We show that as exacerbated development by better-informed venture-backed rms...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320264
The decision to cooperate within R&D joint ventures is often based on expert advice such advice typically originates in a due diligence process, which assesses the R&D joint ventures profitability, for example, by appraising the achievability of synergies. We show that if the experts who advise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409623
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009680938
This paper analyzes an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009368492
This paper analyses an entry timing game with uncertain entry costs. Two firms receive costless signals about the cost of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private and public signals. We show that competition leads the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010552475