We analyze the choices between two technologies A and B that both exhibit network effects. We introduce a critical mass game in which coordination on either one of the standards constitutes a Nash equilibrium outcome while coordination on standard B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We present a...

We analyze the choices between two technologies A and B that both exhibit network effects. We introduce a critical mass game in which coordination on either one of the standards constitutes a Nash equilibrium outcome while coordination on standard B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We present a...

We examine a technology adoption game with network effects in which coordination on technology A and technology B constitute a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff-dominant. We define a technology's critical mass as the minimum share of users necessary to make...

We investigate how consumer word of mouth (WOM) develops over time and in turn influences new product adoption. We develop a dynamic aggregate-level model of WOM development and new product diffusion that explicitly captures consumers’ learning of product quality from both marketing...

Around 3 billion people in developing countries rely on woodfuels for their daily cooking needs with profound negative implications for their workload, health, and budget as well as the environment. Improved cookstove (ICS) technologies in many cases appear to be an obvious solution. Despite...

RFID Technology being a real time tracking system is the new era of automation. It has been used in several industries for different applications. However, the cost of implementing RFID system is too high, and achieving the ROI becomes difficult, because of the cost involved. Regardless of the...

This paper analyzes the dynamic incentives for technology adoption under a transferable permits system, which allows for strategic trading on the permit market. Initially, firms can invest both in low-emitting production technologies and trade permits. In the model, technology adoption and...

We introduce a "smart" cap and trade system that eliminates the welfare costs of asymmetric information (“uncertainty”). This cap responds endogenously to technology or macroeconomic shocks, relying on the market price of certificates to aggregate information. It allows policy makers to...

In the COVID-19 pandemic, an unseen high-volume discussion of the disease is observed in online social networks. Not only do scientists and scholars use online social networks to discuss COVID-19 related research findings, but the public also are eager to know up-to-date findings by viewing...