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In this article, we extend the one-period model of Jain and Mirman (1999) for asset trading with two correlated signals to a two period model. We then prove the existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian linear equilibrium. Finally, we perform comparative statics analysis with respect to Kyle...
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The recent theoretical research on the informational effect of insider trading in the spirit of Kyle (1985) and Jain and Mirman (1999) was mainly interested in the interaction between the financial and real decisions of the insider, taking into consideration different market structures in both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905782
The recent theoretical research on the informational effect of insider trading in the spirit of Kyle (1985) and Jain and Mirman (1999) was mainly interested in the interaction between the financial and real decisions of the insider, taking into consideration different market structures in both...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010943019
We study an extension of Jain and Mirman (1999) with two insiders under three different market structures: (i) Cournot competition among the insiders, (ii) Stackelberg game between the insiders and (iii) monopoly in the real market and Stackelberg in the financial market. We show how the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009359832
In this paper we examine the real and financial effects of two insiders trading in a static Jain-Mirman model (Henceforth JM). The first insider is the manager of the firm. The second insider is the owner. First, we study the change of the linear-equilibrium variables, in the presence of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014060294
In this paper we examine the real and financial effects of two insiders trading in a static Jain-Mirman model (Henceforth JM). The first insider is the manager of the firm. The second insider is the owner. First, we study the change of the linear-equilibrium variables, in the presence of two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014073603