We extend Kyle's (Kyle, 1985) analysis of sequential auction markets to the case in which a risk-averse insider possesses private information on the liquidation value of a number of risky assets. We confirm: i) in a multi-asset setting, Holden and Subrahmanyam's counter-intuitive result that...

We extend Chau and Vayanos' (Chau and Vayanos, 2008) analysis of an asset market with a strategic insider to the case in which she is risk-averse. As she finds it optimal to trade more aggressively and reveal her private information at a faster pace than her risk-neutral counterpart,...

In an asset market with explicit trading rules we characterize the trading activity of an ambiguity-averse insider who faces Knightian uncertain over other market participants' beliefs and implements a robust trading strategy. Such insider employs a max-min choice mechanism, so that in any round...