Based on a difference-in-differences approach, we find strong evidence that the initial enforcement of insider trading laws improves capital allocation efficiency. The effect is concentrated in developed markets and manifests shortly after the enforcement year. Cross-sectional analyses show that...

Using a corporate lobbying event that led to the unexpected reversal of a tough insider trading blackout regulation in Hong Kong, we examine whether tightening the restrictions of insider trading in family firms-dominated financial markets affects shareholder value. We find that firms more...

Using a lobbying event that led to the unexpected reversal of a tougher insider trading blackout regulation in Hong Kong, we examine whether tightening insider trading regulation increases shareholder value. We find that repealing the regulation increases shareholder value for the entire Hong...

Massa et al. (2015) show that corporate insiders become more opportunistic by selling more and faster in competition with short sellers. By considering the possibility that short sellers may react to insider trading, we propose a new hypothesis that short sellers play a disciplinary role in...