In this paper, I construct a model of an exchange economy in which bankruptcy arises in a manner similar to what we observe. This model is a more realistic representation of some markets in which intertemporal assets are traded. Using standard and natural assumptions, I show that every economy...

The Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy triggered the failure of the collateralized debt markets, which was a major contributor of the financial crisis in 2008. Such collateralized debt markets have both collateral price channel and counterparty (borrower and lender) channel of contagion. I propose a...

This paper introduces agent heterogeneity, liquidity, and endogenous default to a DSGE framework. Our model allows for a comprehensive assessment of regulatory and monetary policy, as well as welfare analysis in the different sectors of the economy. Due to liquidity and endogenous default, the...

We study a competitive model in which market incompleteness implies that debt-financed firms may default in some states of nature and default may lead to the sale of the firms' assets at fire sale prices when markets are illiquid. This incompleteness is the only friction in the model and the...

We study a competitive model in which market incompleteness implies that debt-financed firms may default in some states of nature and default may lead to the sale of the firms' assets at fire sale prices when markets are illiquid. This incompleteness is the only friction in the model and the...

We analyzed default likelihood of North-American corporate obligors in 1995-2014 using Moody's DRD quarterly data for both public and private borrowers. Emergency actions by the lender of last resort (LOLR) during 2008-2009 were a novelty so the impact on credit quality of bank portfolios and...

The Lehman Brothers' 2008 bankruptcy spread losses to its counterparties even when Lehman was a lender of cash, because collateral for that lending was tied up in the bankruptcy process. I study the implications of such lender default using a general equilibrium network model featuring...

We propose an extension of the incomplete markets general equilibrium model with production to situations in which firms default. In the model, firms are assumed to be owned by a single individual whose roles as entrepreneur and consumer are anonymous. Assets are exogenously collateralised and...

We study the design of optimal insurance contracts when the insurer can default on its obligations. In our model default arises endogenously from the interaction of the insurance premium, the indemnity schedule and the insurer's assets. This allows us to understand the joint effect of insolvency...

In the presence of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, the optimal credit contract allows for the possibility of default. In addition, the optimal contract incorporates a precautionary savings motive over and above what agents would otherwise save. When default is sufficiently high, credit markets...