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In a liability problem, the asset value of an insolvent firm must be distributed among the creditors and the firm itself, when the firm has some freedom in negotiating with the creditors. We model the negotiations using cooperative game theory and analyze the Shapley value to resolve such...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012210861
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190389
. Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a corresponding cooperative … the nonemptiness of the core of project games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070682
merge convex and ordinal convex. Generalizing the notions of core cover and compromise stability for transferable utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010250500
.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379216
negative costs on edges and vertices. Among the properties studied are the nonemptiness of the core, characterization of … nonredundant core constraints, ease of computation of the core and the nucleolus, and cases of decomposition of the core and the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206480
.Attention is focused on how to divide the total reward (penalty) among the activities: the core of a correspondingcooperative … nonemptiness of the core of project games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010325893
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissiblegame and the core of a … particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromiseadmissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitional … stable allocations capturedby an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity ofthe core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326439
We offer a new approach to the well-known bankruptcy problem based on Kaminski's idea. With the help of hydraulic rationing we give a proof to Aumann and Maschlers theorem i.e. the consistent solution of a bankruptcy problem is the nucleolus of the corresponding game. We use a system of vessels...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494472