We examine the ex ante effect of an exogenous reduction in secured creditor rights on corporate financial and investment policy. We find that firms increase corporate leverage using both the reduced distress costs of secured debt and the positive externalities the lower secured creditor rights...

Stronger creditor rights reduce credit costs and thus may allow firms to increase leverage and investments, but also increase distress costs and thus may prompt firms to lower leverage and undertake risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. Using a German bankruptcy law reform, on average, we...

Secured lenders have recently demanded a new condition in distressed debt restructurings: competing secured lenders must lose priority. We model the implications of this "creditor-on-creditor violence" trend. In our dynamic model, secured lenders enjoy higher priority in default. However,...

In recent years, acquisition made by distressed firms have become economically important. This paper explores the rationale behind such acquisitions using a natural experiment. Exploiting a recent tax change, which reduces debt restructuring costs for certain creditors and decreases bankruptcy...

This paper analyzes whether the financial distress of a firm affects the investment decisions of non-distressed competitors. On average, firms in distress impose indirect costs to non-distressed competitors by increasing costs of credit in the industry and hence restricting credit access and...

This paper examines the performance of two commonly applied bankruptcy prediction models, the accounting ratio-based Altman Z-Score model, and the structural Distance to Default model which currently underlies Morningstar's Financial Health Grade for public companies (Morningstar 2008)....

We investigate how idiosyncratic lender shocks impact corporate investment. Lenders with recent default experience write stricter loan contracts, leading to a reduction in real investment for borrowing firms. The decline in investment is not attributable to loan riskiness, borrower's agency...

We estimate the economic costs of financial distress by exploiting cross-supplier variation in real estate assets and leverage, and the timing of real estate shocks. We show that for the same client buying from different suppliers, its purchases from distressed suppliers decline by an additional...

Legal rules play a powerful but understudied role in security design. This article presents two new theoretical results about the design of debt contracts. The results derive from the premise that firms must avoid legal insolvency when issuing new debt because insolvency at issuance would...

We examine how creditor protection affects firms with different levels of owners' and managers' personal costs of bankruptcy. Theoretically, we show that firms with high personal costs of bankruptcy borrow and invest more under a more debtor-friendly management stay system, whereas firms with...