We investigate managers' decisions to supplement their firms' management earnings forecasts. We classify these supplementary disclosures as either qualitative "soft talk" disclosures or verifiable forward-looking statements. We find that managers provide "soft talk" disclosures with similar...

This paper examines whether selective access to corporate managers allows investors to revise their beliefs and execute profitable trades. We examine whether investors benefit from two potential opportunities for selective access at invitation-only investor conferences: one-on-one meetings with...

This paper examines whether selective access to corporate managers allows investors to revise their beliefs and execute profitable trades. We examine whether investors benefit from two potential opportunities for selective access at invitation-only investor conferences: one-on-one meetings with...

We study events surrounding ChuoAoyama’s failed audit of Kanebo, a large Japanese cosmetics company whose management engaged in a massive accounting fraud. ChuoAoyama was PwC’s Japanese affiliate and one of Japan’s “Big Four” audit firms. In May 2006, the Japanese Financial Services...