Pichhadze (2010) introduced the Market Oriented Blockholder Model (MOBM) as properly describing the ownership pattern in the American equity markets. Under the model, the emerging blockholder in the American equity markets is the institutional investor (II). This poses a challenge to the...

The effectiveness of shareholder voting as a governance mechanism depends in large part on the voting behavior of institutional investors, many of whom receive recommendations on how to vote from proxy advisors such as ISS. Company managers and policymakers are increasingly concerned that...

The presentation slides in this document provide an overview of our study "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2982617" The Agency Problems of Institutional Investors, which was published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives in its summer 2007 issue. The slides build on our...

Has the antitrust arsenal run out of novel theories or weapons? Think again. Recent scholarship has come to challenge conventional wisdom with the latest target of antitrust imagination being institutional investors, including diversified index funds. New economic research suggests that common...

Pichhadze (2010) introduced the Market Oriented Blockholder Model (MOBM) as properly describing the ownership pattern in the American equity markets. Under the model, the emerging blockholder in the American equity markets is the institutional investor (II). This poses a challenge to the...

While shareholder engagement has captured much attention recently, the evidence on the role of large institutional investors remains relatively scarce. Large asset managers have become an increasingly powerful force since the financial crisis of 2008, with the top 20 managers controlling...

We investigate whether business ties with portfolio firms influence mutual funds' proxy voting using a comprehensive data set spanning 2003 to 2011. In contrast to prior literature, we find that business ties significantly influence pro-management voting at the level of individual pairs of fund...

We analyze how the rise of institutional investors has transformed the governance landscape. While corporate ownership is now concentrated in the hands of institutional investors that can exercise stewardship of those corporations that would be impossible for dispersed shareholders, the...

Proxy advisory firms and large passive mutual funds have faced criticism both for being too powerful and not exercising diligence in proxy voting. We document that the ``Big 3'' passive fund families, Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, are increasingly likely to vote with management, and...

In this paper I examine the phenomenon called Hedge Fund Activism and its effect on the governance of public corporations in the United States.The following subtopics are addressed:1. Definition of Hedge Fund Activism, its primary objective and typical targets;2. Review of the public policy...