Institutional investors vote corporate proxies on behalf of underlying investors and beneficiaries. We show a strong relation between this voting and public opinion on corporate governance (as reflected in media coverage and surveys), with similarly strong results for voting by mutual funds. We...

Using a new measure of shareholder inattention based on exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we document a positive and significant relation between firms with distracted institutional shareholders and the cost of debt financing. This effect is stronger for firms with...

Purpose: Study the impact of the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, on firm credit ratings.Methodology/Approach: Use a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1985 to 2006 (20,670 U.S. firm-year observations) to empirically investigate the...

We examine the influence of institutional investors' investment horizons on a firm's cost of equity. We argue that the cost of equity will decrease in the presence of institutional investors with longer-term investment horizons due to improved monitoring and information quality. Our empirical...

This paper examines the relevance of institutional investors' investment horizon, as reflected in the response of firm investment to internal cash flows. We argue that institutional investors with longer investment horizons have greater incentives and efficiencies to engage in effective...