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may contain members who add no new information to the collective decision. We show that the optimal committee is larger … corruptible. We also show that keeping committee members anonymous and accountable for their votes can help deter capture …
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This paper explores whether professional macroeconomic forecasters manipulate their forecasts to influence voting …
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A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority...
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We analyse the Swedish general elections that took place in spring and autumn 1887. Our aim is to discover which groups of voters were responsible for the severe losses that the supporters of free trade suffered in the second of these contests, and that allowed the protectionists to gain the...
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current paper develops a voting model where citizens are uncertain about the welfare effects induced by alternative policy … groups in order to influence the public opinion. In the case of voting over the level of a productivity-enhancing public bad …
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This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
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