In this paper, a group contest is analyzed, where the groups are allowed to determine their sharing rules either sequentially or simultaneously. It is found that in case the more numerous group determines its sharing rule prior to the smaller group, rent dissipation in the group contest is...

List of contributors -- 1. Introduction / Bernardo Bortolotti and Gianluca Fiorentini -- Pt. I. Organized interests produce legislation. 2. Political institutions as screening devices / Gianluigi Galeotti ; 3. Electoral rules and interest groups: the mix of direct and indirect taxation /...

This article addresses the influence of politicians, managers, and the dispositions of street-level bureaucrats in shaping actions at the frontlines of policy implementation. We investigate these for the implementation of employment policy reforms in Denmark. Our findings show a large percentage...

This paper examines behavior (the oretically and experimentally) in a two-stage group contest where the fi rst stage comprises of intra - group contests, followed by an inter-group contest in the second stage. Rewards accrue only to the members of the winning group in the inter-group contest,...