A simple dynamic game is used for analyzing international environmental problems and climate agreements. Different countries are, over time, emitting as well as investing in green technology. In this framework, we can analyze the business-as-usual outcome, short vs. long term agreements,...

I develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient,...

I study dynamic private provision of public goods (or bads) when agents (or countries) can invest in cost-reducing technologies and sign incomplete contracts. The model leads to a dynamic common pool problem that is more severe than its static counter-part. Nevertheless, a sequence of short-term...

Real-world negotiations differ fundamentally from existing bargaining theory. Inspired by the Paris Agreement on climate change, this paper develops a novel bargaining game in which each party quanti.es its own contribution (to a public good, for example), before the set of pledges must be...

Can trade agreements motivate environmental conservation? I first present a model whereby the government in the South expands its production capacity (e.g., deforest) before trading with the North. After deriving negative relationships between tariff reductions and conservation, I show how all...

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are...