We investigate whether characteristics of firms' debt structure, beyond leverage, are associated with predictable variation in conditional conservatism. The contracting theory of conservatism holds that conditional conservatism is an efficient mechanism employed by an organization to address...

We examine the determinants of events of default clauses in syndicated loan and bond contracts, provisions that allow lenders to request the repayment of principal and to terminate lending commitments. We document significant variation in the use of default clauses and their restrictiveness...

The maintenance of financial liquidity, stability, profitability and the value and investment capabilities of a company as well as the avoidance of financial bottlenecks are the most vital objectives of people in charge of ac ompany, especially in times of crisis. This paper presents the...

We examine whether performance-sensitive debt (PSD) is used to reduce hold-up problems in long-term lending relationships. We find that the use of PSD is more common in the presence of a long-term lending relationship and if the borrower has fewer financing alternatives available. In syndicated...

Venture debt, or loans to rapid-growth start-ups, is a puzzle. How are start-ups with no track records, positive cash flows, tangible collateral, or personal guarantees from entrepreneurs able to attract billions of dollars in loans each year? And why do start-ups take on debt rather than rely...

Many U.S. corporate bonds are either callable or convertible. While callable bonds provide a higher coupon to bondholders in exchange for a firm's repurchase option of its claim, convertible bonds offer investors the option to exchange a firm's debt to equity. This paper analyzes the choice...

In this paper we build a theoretical model of a firm repurchasing its corporate debt. We find that firm creditors as a group sell debt to the firm only at face value. However, because of the cross-creditor externalities buying back debt is cheaper and easier when there are many creditors, e.g.,...

I develop a dynamic capital structure model in which shareholders determine a firm's leverage ratio, debt maturity, and default strategy. In my model, the firm's debt matures all at once. Therefore, after repaying the principal shareholders own all the firm's cash flows and can pick a new...

I analyze both CEO inside debt and firm debt jointly to further investigate the compensation incentives on risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions concerning the debt structure of the firm. I find larger firms with high CEO inside debt tend to diversify, as calculated...

We study the impact of the optimal debt and priority structure on corporate financing and investment decisions in a dynamic trade-off model, where a firm simultaneously issues bank and market debt. Private bank debt is renegotiable during financial distress; thus it avoids inefficient and costly...