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Long-term care and births timing
Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Gregory - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289929
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Long-term care and births timing
Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Gregory - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301870
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Long-term care policy, myopia and redistribution
Cremer, Helmuth; Roeder, Kerstin - In: Journal of public economics 108 (2013), pp. 33-43
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010257944
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Long-term care and births timing
Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Gregory - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524353
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Long-term care and births timing
Pestieau, Pierre; Ponthiere, Gregory - In: Journal of health economics 50 (2016), pp. 340-357
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011589312
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Insuring longevity risk and long-term care : bequest, housing and liquidity
Xu, Mengyi; Alonso-García, Jennifer; Sherris, Michael; … - In: Insurance / Mathematics & economics 111 (2023), pp. 121-141
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014317139
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Insuring longevity risk and long-term care : bequest, housing, and liquidity
Xu, Mengyi; Alonso-García, Jennifer; Sherris, Michael; … - 2022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013503805
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Investment behaviour in a two-period contest model
Grossmann, Martin; Dietl, Helmut - In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics : JITE 165 (2009) 3, pp. 401-417
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003884565
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The timing of preference and prejudice in sequential hiring games
Waddell, Glen R.; Lee, Logan M. - 2014
We model a hiring process in which the candidate is evaluated sequentially by two agents of the firm who each observe an independent signal of the candidate's productivity. We introduce the potential for taste-based discrimination and characterize how one agent's private valuation of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010404030
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The Timing of Preference and Prejudice in Sequential Hiring Games
Waddell, Glen R. - 2014
We model a hiring process in which the candidate is evaluated sequentially by two agents of the firm who each observe an independent signal of the candidate's productivity. We introduce the potential for taste-based discrimination and characterize how one agent's private valuation of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046666