We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in which corporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show that firms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors using the timing of...

The paper comments on Khan et al. (J Assoc Inf Syst 18(5):372–402, 2017), who study real option exercise decisions in the context of a single IT project and in a portfolio setting, respectively. The issues identified concern the concept of (economic) rationality and the treatment of project...

We show how directors can set the strength of a firm's anti-takeover provisions in order to influence the investment-timing decision of a future empire-building CEO. The prospect of future hostile takeover attempts, which terminate the CEO's control benefits if successful, affects the CEO's...

The accuracy of firm information disclosures and the efficiency of long-term investment both play crucial roles in the economy and capital markets. We estimate a dynamic model that captures a trade-off between these two goals that arises when managers confront realistic incentives to misreport...

We study how interest alignment between CEOs and corporate boards influences investment efficiency and identify a novel force behind the benefit of misaligned preferences. Our model entails a CEO who encounters a project, gathers investment-relevant information, and decides whether or not to...

I show that access to the public debt market is associated with a significant reduction in the level of capital expenditures and takeovers, especially for firms with higher credit risk. Firms accessing the bond market also become less likely to violate debt covenants, reduce the level of payouts...

This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...

We study the differences in the allocation of cash flow between Western European private and public firms. Public firms have a significantly higher investment-cash flow sensitivity than comparable private firms. These differences in investment-cash flow sensitivities are not due to more...