Private equity funds (PEFs) eliminate entity-level taxation by using pass-through entities. They further minimize their investors' tax liability by taking the position that profits distributed to both general partners (GPs) and limited partners (LPs) are passive portfolio investment income and...

Tax incentives are a key component of governments’ investment policy mix as they directly impact companies’ tax burden. In this paper, we illustrate the EU’s tax attractiveness as investment location over time in terms of effective average tax rates and evaluate potential tax reform...

Petroleum administration can be regarded as a principal-agent problem. The government allocates exploration and production rights to petroleum companies on behalf of the population. The government is the principal and the companies are agents. With the aim of capturing revenue for the state, the...

This paper analyzes the role of Tax Incentives in promoting investment, their effectiveness and their revenue and other costs and political economy. The paper consolidates econometric work on the topic done by the authors covering the Caribbean, Francophone Africa and India; surveys of Investors...

This working paper presents the analytical framework used by the Secretariat to estimate the direct effects of the Pillar One and Pillar Two proposals on MNE’s investment costs. The analysis builds on the standard ETR framework and extends it in two important respects. First, ETRs are...

Petroleum administration can be regarded as a principal-agent problem. The government allocates exploration and production rights to petroleum companies on behalf of the population. The government is the principal and the companies are agents. With the aim of capturing revenue for the state, the...

This paper investigates two closely related questions concerning the responses of Multi-National Enterprise (MNE) investment to corporate income taxation using a panel of unconsolidated subsidiary-level and consolidated group-level data from the ORBIS database. First, the paper provides new...

In this paper, we model the tax setting game between two revenue maximizing countries which compete for the location of a single production plant owned by a multinational firm. We introduce the possibility that the multinational can shift a fraction of its profits out of the country where the...

This paper investigates the consequences of a series of alternative international tax designs on the strategy of a multinational enterprise regarding the cross border distribution of its investment and the choice of its financing behavior. We start with a world where no international tax rules...