The liberalization of telecommunications is largely based on the premise that increasing competition will encourage investment. The hypothesis that liberalization promotes investment has received the most empirical support in recent research. However, a key question that has been largely ignored...

We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider’s incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide...

We investigate how various institutional settings affect a network provider's incentives to invest in infrastructure quality. Under reasonable assumptions on demand, investment incentives turn out to be smaller under vertical separation than under vertical integration, though we also provide...

We explore the separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch of government as a way of overcoming the dynamic consistency problem of regulatory policy towards investment. We model the industry as a regulated duopoly. The incumbent is a vertically integrated firm that owns...

We study an industry in which an upstream monopolist supplies an essential input at a regulated price to several downstream firms. Legal unbundling means that a downstream firm owns the upstream firm but this upstream firm is legally independent and maximizes its own upstream profits. We allow...

We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck (e.g. a transmission network) supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in...

Power market integration is analyzed in a two countries model with nationally regulated firms and costly public funds. If generation costs between the two countries are too similar negative business-stealing outweighs efficiency gains so that following integration welfare decreases in both...

The ladder of investment is a regulatory approach that has been used by European National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), in order to foster infrastructure competition among operators. the idea is to force incumbent operators to open several levels of access to their network in such a way that...

This article addresses the impact of regulatory policy on levels of infrastructure deployment and derived welfare in the telecommunications sector. The model considers two potentially coexisting and partially competing techniques (the "old" ADSL - Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Line - technique)...

We investigate the incentives for facility-based firms to invest in infrastructure upgrades and to foreclose service-based firms. We focus on asymmetric regulation regarding servicebased firms' access to the infrastructure held by a facility-based firm. Spillovers from the infrastructure...