Stronger creditor rights reduce credit costs and thus may allow firms to increase leverage and investments, but also increase distress costs and thus may prompt firms to lower leverage and undertake risk-reducing but unprofitable investments. Using a German bankruptcy law reform, on average, we...

We use business register data for the United Kingdom to document the importance of the different channels that firms use to adjust their size. We show how the choice of adjustment channel impacts upon firm-level variables such as wages or productivity.

When previous studies analyze the relationship between compensation scheme and corporate behavior, they do not explicitly consider the personal risk aversion of executives. We directly measure the degree of risk aversion by a survey with Japanese data. We find that the higher the personal risk...

We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder-debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41...

This paper analyzes whether the financial distress of a firm affects the investment decisions of non-distressed competitors. On average, firms in distress impose indirect costs to non-distressed competitors by increasing costs of credit in the industry and hence restricting credit access and...

We investigate how idiosyncratic lender shocks impact corporate investment. Lenders with recent default experience write stricter loan contracts, leading to a reduction in real investment for borrowing firms. The decline in investment is not attributable to loan riskiness, borrower's agency...

The investment premium -- the finding that firms with low asset growth deliver high average returns -- is an integral part of recent factor models. I document empirically that the investment premium (1) reflects leverage, (2) does not exist among zero-leverage firms, and (3) increases with...

This paper develops a dynamic model of capital structure and investment. In a world with low and high ability managers, the former mask as the latter, but to do so have to overstate both earnings and investment. Debt is a mechanism that eventually separates investors' abilities, at the cost of...

We study the interaction between financing and investment decisions in a dynamic model where the firm has multiple debt issues and equityholders choose the timing of investment. Jointly optimal capital and priority structures can virtually eliminate investment distortions, because debt priority...

Using a dynamic model of strategic bargaining between equity and debt holders following default, we analyze the impact of shareholder bargaining power on the investment effects of debt overhang. Our empirical tests utilize a new measure of debt overhang wedge based on default probabilities...