We examine how division managers' human capital affects internal capital allocation using a hand-collected data set of divisional managers at S&P 1,500 firms. Based on a novel measure of division-manager ability, we show that more able division managers receive substantially larger capital...

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected...

Our research tests the difference in investment efficiency between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms and then evaluates the effect of privatisation and equitisation policies on the investment efficiency of former state owned enterprises (SOEs). We use a novel dataset from Viet Nam...

I show that access to the public debt market is associated with a significant reduction in the level of capital expenditures and takeovers, especially for firms with higher credit risk. Firms accessing the bond market also become less likely to violate debt covenants, reduce the level of payouts...

We document sizeable and surprising differences in investment behavior between stock market listed and privately held firms in the U.S. using a rich new data source on private firms. Listed firms invest substantially less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities compared to...

We investigate whether short-termism distorts the investment decisions of stock market listed firms. To do so, we compare the investment behavior of observably similar public and private firms using a new data source on private U.S. firms, assuming for identification that closely held private...

This paper builds on Rosen (1981) and Hvide (2002) to provide a simple framework that elucidates the nature of incentives in the tournaments among top executives in both the external managerial labor market for the top executive positions in other companies and within the executives' own firm...

This paper investigates how corporate governance of unlisted firms in an emerging market economy affects financing constraints, measured by the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. We develop two original corporate governance indices based on a large-scale survey of Russian enterprises –...

We show that executives cut investment when their incentives become more short-term. We examine a unique event in which hundreds of firms eliminated option vesting periods to avoid a drop in income under accounting rule FAS 123-R. This event allowed executives to exercise options earlier and...

I examine the effects of entrenchment on corporate investment and firm performance. To achieve identification, I use a novel measure of entrenchment and an instrumental variable based on firms' IPO cohort. I find that entrenchment reduces capital expenditures, R&D, and productivity, weakens a...