This paper addresses the questions whether European mutual fund managers rely on sell-side analyst information with respect to their investment decisions and whether this behavior impacts fund performance. Based on a sample of over 4,300 European mutual funds and around 1.2 million portfolio...

We survey more than 200 private equity (PE) managers from firms with $1.9 trillion of assets under management (AUM) about their portfolio performance, decision-making and activities during the COVID-19 pandemic. Given that PE managers have significant incentives to maximize value, their actions...

Managerial incentives are skewed in non-listed funds under finite horizons. Compensation structures are only indirectly related to shareholder wealth maximization when share prices are unobservable. Liquidity options for investors are limited in the absence of an exchange listing. Using a...

Managerial incentives are skewed in non-listed funds under finite horizons. Compensation structures are only indirectly related to shareholder wealth maximization when share prices are unobservable. Liquidity options for investors are limited in the absence of an exchange listing. Using a...

If a bidder launches a takeover offer for a listed company being part of a stock market index, then index funds and exchange traded funds (ETF) as shareholders of this company cannot easily tender their shares without losing track of the index. This paper analyzes the impact of index fund and...

A fund's performance is usually compared to the performance of an index or other funds. If a fund trails the benchmark, the fund manager is often replaced. We argue that this may lead to excessive risk-taking if fund managers differ in ability and have the opportunity to take excessive risk. To...

We present a model with dynamic investment flows, where fund managers have the ability to generate excess returns and study how forcing them to commit part or all of their personal wealth to the fund they manage affects fund risk taking. We contrast the behavior of a manager that may invest her...

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending (i.e., a fund lending to other funds belonging to the same mutual fund family), fund families can obtain permission from the regulators to set up interfund lending programs. We analyze the determinants and consequences of such programs. We find...

Private equity fund managers are typically required to invest their own money alongside the fund. We examine how this coinvestment affects the acquisition strategy of leveraged buyout funds. In a simple model, where the investment and capital structure decisions are made simultaneously, we show...