I model an open-end mutual fund investing in illiquid assets and show that the fund's endogenous cash management can generate shareholder runs even with a flexible NAV. The fund optimally re-builds its cash buffers at time t + 1 after outflows at t to prevent future forced sales of illiquid...

Fund managers are double agents; they serve both fund investors and owners of management firms. This conflict of interest may result in trading to support securities prices. Tests of this hypothesis in the Spanish mutual fund industry indicate that bank-affiliated mutual funds systematically...

I model an open-end mutual fund investing in illiquid assets and show that the fund's endogenous cash management can generate shareholder runs even with a flexible NAV. The fund optimally re-builds its cash buffers at time t 1 after outflows at t to prevent future forced sales of illiquid...

The paper investigates how the characteristics of the distribution network and the affiliation to a banking group affect mutual funds performance exploiting a unique dataset with extremely detailed information on funds' portfolios and bank-issuer relationships for the period 2006-2017. We find...

Using data on Spanish mutual funds, we show that bank-affiliated funds provide funding support to their parent company via purchases of bonds in the primary market. Funding from affiliated funds increases when it is most valuable, i.e., in times of financial stress and to riskier banks with...

This paper investigates how precautionary trading behavior of fund managers induced by a higher junior fee component in their compensation structure affects prices of downgraded loans in the leveraged loans market. Using detailed portfolio data from Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) funds, we...

I model an open-end mutual fund investing in illiquid assets and show that the fund’s endogenous cash management can generate shareholder runs even with a flexible NAV. The fund optimally re-builds its cash buffers at time t + 1 after outflows at t to prevent future forced sales of illiquid...

I explain the standard carried interest contract as a mechanism to induce incentive compatible fund leverage while also satisfying LP return objectives. Fee, leverage and target return data from private equity real estate (PERE) funds are used to calibrate the model. Steps in the modeling...

Using fund-, firm- and bank-level data we investigate the investments of private equity (PE) funds in the north-western regions of Italy. Both the private equity fund managers and the PE investments are heavily concentrated in this most developed area of the country. The average size of the...

Although the 1940 Act restricts interfund lending within a mutual fund family, families can apply for exemptions from the regulator to participate in interfund lending. We find that heterogeneity in portfolio liquidity and investor flows across funds, funds' investment restrictions, and...