Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...

What pay can a worker expect when he is unsure about his ability (or effort supply) and that of his co-workers? Workers have varying (unobserved) abilities, but can observe their distributions in the population. We uncover four findings. First, we uniquely characterize workers' expected pay in a...

We study procedures that embed clauses granting agents the right to oppose actions that are not in their interest, retract actions that face opposition, and punish harmful actions. Our analyses show that coalitional strategic behaviors under these procedures lead to reciprocal actions. We then...

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash...

Aguiar, Pongou, and Tondji (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology,...

This paper considers the problem faced by a political authority that has to design a legislative mechanism that guarantees the selection of policies that are stable, efficient, and inclusive in the sense of strategically protecting minority interests. Experimental studies suggest that some of...

We develop an axiomatic foundation for the classical problem of paying workers in settings where their actions are not observed by the employer. The latter only observes the distribution of ability and demands fairness. First, we uniquely characterize workers’ expected pay thanks to a set of...

Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of distributive justice guarantee that a pure-strategy Nash...

How does fairness affect individual incentives and efficiency in a free economy? We show that elementary distributive justice principles guarantee a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a finite economy where agents non-cooperatively choose their inputs and derive utility from their pay. Chief...