I consider the effects of entrepreneurial inequity-aversion on financial contracting with a self-interested venture capitalist, in a single-sided and double-sided moral hazard setting. In the pure principal-agent model, as the proportion of self-interested entrepreneurs in the population...

We consider the combined impact of agency problems and social fairness norms on venture capital/entrepreneur contracting and performance. Particularly, we develop a behavioural game-theoretic model in which a venture capitalist and an entrepreneur negotiate over their respective equity shares,...

We consider the impact of fairness and moral hazard in a principal-agent bargaining model, where the agent can affect the size of the surplus by his actions. Our main results are as follows; a) the offer predicted by the basic fairness model (excluding moral hazard) results in inefficient...

Behavioral economists are increasingly debating the desirability of overconfidence for individual and social welfare. For example, in Gervais and Goldstein's (2003) model of teamwork, a two-player team consisting of one overconfident and one rational agent outperforms a team consisting of two...