We present the results of an experiment that measures social preferences within couples in a context where intra-household pay-off inequality can be reduced at the cost of diminishing household income. We measure social norms regarding this efficiency-equality trade-off and implement a...

Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We nd that envy-free procedures, in particular Selfridge-Conway, are fairer and also are perceived as fairer than their...

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three different equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows...

In this paper we explore the relationship between an equitable distribution of the cost shares in public-good provision on the one hand and the core property of an allocation on the other. In particular we show that it is an inhomogeneous distribution of cost shares that motivates some coalition...

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...

In a claims problem, we propose a new game for strategic justification of the constrained equal awards rule. In contrast to Li and Ju (Mimeo, 2016) and Tsay and Yeh (Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 515-532, 2019), our game is "procedurally fair" (claimants are treated equally) and...

In this paper, we investigate the possibility of having stable rules for two- sided markets with transferable utility, that satisfy some valuation monotonicity and fairness axioms. Valuation fairness requires that changing the valuation of a buyer for the object of a seller leads to equal...

A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...

This paper experimentally investigates cooperative game theory from a normative perspective. Subjects designated as Decision Makers express their view on what is fair for others, by recommending a payoff allocation for three subjects (Recipients) whose substitutabilities and complementarities...