In theoretical literature, the effects of employment protection on unemployment are ambiguous. Higher employment protection decreases job creation as well as job destruction. However, in most models, wages are bargained individually between workers and firms. Using a conventional matching model...

Employers who use temporary agency staff in contrast to regular staff are not affected by employment protection regulations when terminating a job. Therefore, services provided by temporary work agencies may be seen as a substitute for regular employment. In this paper, we analyze the effects of...

Angesichts der seit mehr als zwei Jahrzehnten andauernden Massenarbeitslosigkeit ist das Kündigungsschutzrecht in den meisten kontinentaleuropäischen Ländern in den Mittelpunkt der Kontroverse um die Flexibilisierung der Arbeitsmärkte gerückt. Kritiker des Kündigungsschutzes behaupten,...

The current unemployment insurance and employment protection legislation were set up in an economic environment in which relationships between workers and firms were typically long-lasting and stable. The increasing globalisation of the economy and the rapid technological and organisational...

Die Arbeitsmarktreformen von 2003 bis 2005 haben entscheidend zu einer bemerkenswerten Trendumkehr auf dem deutschen Arbeitsmarkt beigetragen und damit auch einen wichtigen Beitrag geleistet, das Land besser auf die Konsequenzen des bevorstehenden demografischen Wandels vorzubereiten. Die...

In this study we examine the contribution of severance pay to employment and unemployment development using data on industrialized OECD countries. Our starting point is Lazear?s (1990) empirical dictum that severance payment requirements adversely impact the labor market. We extend his sample...

In this paper we conduct an analysis of the effects of firing costs in models that consider simultaneously worker heterogeneity, imperfect information on their productivity and union power. We consider an OLG model where heterogeneous workers participate in the labour market both when young and...

This paper presents a model allowing to analyze voting, welfare institutions and economic performance. We consider a political economy framework with three classes of agents: entrepreneurs, employed workers and unemployed workers. Agents vote on alternative institutional options: the degree of...

Empirical investigation of the labor market consequences of employment protection has mushroomed since Lazear's (1990) pioneering study. Having sketched the theoretical background, we chart the course of the modern empirical literature. We focus mainly on dismissals protection, distinguishing...

This paper shows that the effects of employment protection critically depend on its enforcement. For this purpose, we capture evasion of employment protection via market exit in a setting of monopolistic competition. We find that the number of firms entering the market depends on firing costs...