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Harmful Signals - Cartel Prohibition and Oligopoly Theory in the Age of Machine Learning

Thomas, Stefan - 2019

communicative acts. Some authors therefore conclude that the cartel prohibition of Article 101 TFEU or Section 1 of the U.S. Sherman …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012869810

Assessing autonomous algorithmic collusion : Q-learning under short-run price commitments

Klein, Timo - 2018 - Revision: September 2018

A novel debate within competition policy and regulation circles is whether autonomous machine learning algorithms may learn to collude on prices. We show that when fims face short-run price commitments, independent Q-learning (a simple but well-established self-learning algorithm) learns to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011869980

Algorithms, Machine Learning, and Collusion

Schwalbe, Ulrich - 2018

This paper discusses the question whether self-learning price-setting algorithms are able to coordinate their pricing behaviour to achieve a collusive outcome that maximizes the joint profits of the firms using these algorithms. While the legal literature generally assumes that algorithmic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912903

Screen for collusive behavior : a machine learning approach

Bantle, Melissa - 2024

The paper uses a machine learning technique to build up a screen for collusive behavior. Such tools can be applied by competition authorities but also by companies to screen the behavior of their suppliers. The method is applied to the German retail gasoline market to detect anomalous behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014491825

Estimating Cartel Damages using Machine Learning

März, Oliver - 2019

This paper argues that the widely applied practice of using OLS regression to predict “but-for” prices for cartel …-for” prices for the counterfactual scenario that no cartel existed, and to calculate damages based on those predictions. It … estimate of cartel-related damages …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865403

How communication makes the difference between a cartel and tacit collusion : a machine learning approach

Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa Verena; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2022

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free … cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly … sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013164725