We analyze the dynamics of banks' regulatory capital ratios. Using monthly data of regulatory capital ratios for a subset of large German banks, we estimate the target level and the adjustment speed of the capital ratio for each bank separately. We find evidence that, first, there exists a...

This paper examines how capital is determined by German banks. We analyse whether the determinants found in the previous empirical literature hold for the special German banking sector with its three characteristic banking groups of savings banks, cooperative banks and other banks. On the basis...

This paper documents that standard cross-sectional determinants of firm leverage also apply to the capital structure of large banks in the United States and Europe. We find a remarkable consistency in sign, significance and economic magnitude. Like non-financial firms, banks appear to have...

Die aktuelle Finanzkrise, die einen Höhepunkt im Zusammenbruch der Investmentbank Lehmann Brothers fand, zeigt immer deutlichere Auswirkungen auf die Realwirtschaft außerhalb des Bankensektors. Durch diese Krise haben sich im Bankensektor zunehmende Liquiditätsschwierigkeiten entwickelt, die...

We apply control rights theory to explain the structure and determinants of financial covenants in private equity backed leveraged buyouts. We analyze 130 German transactions from 2000 to 2008, covering about 40 percent of the LBO market during this period. We consider Germany to be a superior...

In this paper we review the actual operational data of an anonymous Central European Bank, using two approaches described in the literature: the loss distribution approach and the extreme value theory (EVT). Within the EVT analysis, two estimation methods were applied; the standard maximum...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...

This paper deals with the relation between excessive risk taking and capital structure in banks. Examining a quarterly dataset of U.S. banks between 1993 and 2010, we find that equity is valued higher when more risky portfolios are chosen when leverage is high, and that more risk taking has a...

The paper shows that mispriced deposit insurance and capital regulation were of second order importance in determining the capital structure of large U.S. and European banks during 1991 to 2004. Instead, standard cross-sectional determinants of non-financial firms’ leverage carry over to...

We extend the literature on the effects of managerial entrenchment to consider how safety-net subsidies and financial distress costs interact with managerial incentives to influence capital structure in U.S. commercial banking. Using cross-sectional data on publicly traded, highest-level U.S....