In this note we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a game of repeated interaction where firms can price … improvement in data quality it is more difficult to sustain collusion. …

is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion … expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma …

Tacit collusion reduces welfare comparably to explicit collusion but remains mostly unaddressed by antitrust … that facilitate tacit collusion by providing quantitative evidence that links these actions to an anticompetitive market … about collusion. …

-monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion. …

This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of … reduction resulting from debarment may trigger tacit collusion. …