Showing 1 - 10 of 417
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011812027
This paper develops a model of the birth and death of cartels in the presence of enforcement activities by a Competition Authority (CA). We distinguish three sets of interventions: (a) detecting, prosecuting and penalizing cartels; (b) actions that aim to stop cartel activity in the short-term,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431514
We study antitrust enforcement that channels price-fixing incentives through setting fines and allocating resources to detection activities. Antitrust fines obey four legal principles: punishments should fit the crime, proportionality, bankruptcy considerations, and minimum fines. Bankruptcy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224778
The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and more important as private damage suits in the aftermath of antitrust litigation increase. The approaches implementation is embedded into current legal environments with regards to the estimation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010230329
This paper describes some major trends in cartelization of markets worldwide with a special emphasis on the economic injuries being generated by illegal collusion. Known affected commerce by international cartels discovered during 1990-2014 exceeds a nominal $13.6 trillion worldwide. Projections...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954044
Based on an analysis of cartel prosecutions since 2007, this article assesses the way the European Commission has built up its fines in practice. The fines are compared with those imposed by the European Commission over the period from 1999 to 2006. The main findings are that, while fines have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940532
In this paper we set out the welfare economics based case for imposing cartel penalties on the cartel overcharge rather than on the more conventional bases of revenue or profits (illegal gains). To do this we undertake a systematic comparison of a penalty based on the cartel overcharge with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046043
Cartels are often fought by granting leniency, in the form of forgiveness of penalties, to whistle-blowers. This study employs a laboratory experiment to compare leniency programs that differ with respect to fine size and whether a second whistle-blower may apply for leniency. The results show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220240
The assumption that firms maximize profit has been widely used in Economics to explain firms' behaviors and market outcomes. But the profit maximization assumption may lead to incorrect predictions when firms engage in strategic delegation between owners and managers who might have different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289637
This chapter sets out the principles and emerging practice governing cartel damages in the EU and UK. It identifies the types of damages available; the issue surrounding causation, pass-on, volume effects, and mitigation; and the methods that have been be used to estimate overcharges, volume...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212073