Collusive agreements in the form of cartels among firms are complex structures. The involved firms need to agree on prices and sales quotas that are legally not enforceable. Market characteristics that foster cartels’ failure or success are widely examined. However, the interplay between the...

Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...

Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...

Usually, economic research on collusion looks at the firms and how they optimally behave. The complex situation in which involved agents of the firms find themselves tends to be overly simplified or overlooked. This exploratory paper looks through the lens of the `governance of the commons' to...

Governing the complex institution of a business cartel is a highly involved topic. Operating outside the legal sphere, the cartel firms simultaneously need to harmonize prices and quantities, avoid discovery by the authorities, but also ensure that no member cheats on the others. This...