For criminal violations of the Sherman Act, although guided by federal sentencing guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly always determinative. In this paper, we analyze the...

Using the overcharge estimates for 333 cartel episodes, we evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics and changes in the market and legal environment on the magnitude of overcharges imposed by private cartels in the US and other geographic markets as early as the 18th century. The median...

For criminal violations of the Sherman Act, although guided by federal sentencing guidelines, U.S. Department of Justice has great latitude in recommending corporate cartel fines to the federal courts, and its recommendations are nearly always determinative. In this paper, we analyze the...

Using the overcharge estimates for 395 cartel episodes, we evaluate the impact of cartel characteristics on the size of overcharges imposed by cartels in different geographic markets and during six antitrust law regimes starting from the 18th century. We find that the average overcharge imposed...

In this paper, we estimate quantitatively the determinants of variation in administrative fines imposed on companies by the European Commission for price-fixing violations. Estimates from our behavioral model provide the first direct test of the predictive power of the optimal deterrence theory...

Legal opinion is divided on whether predicable sentences are a good thing for the administration of justice. In the case of cartel violations, both the United States and the EU have introduced guidelines for calculating fines that are intended to make fining decisions more transparent and to...