Recent laboratory experiments support the popular view that the introduction of corporate leniency programs has significantly decreased cartel activity. The design of these repeated game experiments however is such that engaging in illegal price discussions is the only way for subjects to avoid...

For a general class of oligopoly models with price competition, we analyze the impact of ex-ante leniency programs in antitrust regulation on the endogenous maximal-sustainable cartel price. This impact depends upon industry characteristics including its cartel culture. Our analysis disentangles...

The paper focuses on the various methods used to quantify cartel damages, which have become more and more important as private damage suits in the aftermath of antitrust litigation increase. The approaches implementation is embedded into current legal environments with regards to the estimation...

Antitrust issues increasingly reach beyond national borders. This paper addresses the question whether such issues can reasonably be solved by an extraterritorial application of national competition law or whether they call for an international competition policy of its own. The analysis is...

The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration of the subsequent...

The appeals process – whereby the losing party of an administrative or judicial decision can seek reconsideration of their arguments before a higher institution – is an important mechanism to correct legal errors and to improve existing laws and regulations. We use data of 467 firm groups...