This paper examines moral hazard in teams over time. Agents are collectively engaged in an uncertain project, and their individual efforts are unobserved. Free-riding leads not only to a reduction in effort, but also to procrastination. The collaboration dwindles over time, but never ceases as...

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing....

The purpose of the paper is to explore, from an assessment viewpoint, the ideas below. Economics, as a social science, has always considered sets of individuals with assumed characteristics, namely the level of knowledge, although in an implicit way in most of the cases. In this sense, an...

This paper has investigated the asymmetric policies of information sharing in duopoly. We built on the classic model of Gal-Or (1985), extended to allow different precisions of firms' private information, as Gal-Or (1985) suggested in her conclusion. We find that asymmetric equilibria will...

I develop a theory of knowledge sharing in organizations where coordinated activity requires shared knowledge, and knowledge sharing is local and costly. Because knowledge sharing is local, knowledge diffuses gradually across an organization. Because knowledge sharing is costly, diffusion may...

In this paper we study a model where non-cooperative agents may exchange knowledge in a competitive environment. As a potential factor that could induce the knowledge disclosure between humans we consider the timing of the moves of players. We develop a simple model of a multistage game in which...

In this paper a game theoretic model is employed to analyze the relationship between strategic location decision of firms in the supply chain considering the role of horizontal and vertical knowledge spillovers, and numerical approach is applied to characterize the equilibria of the considered...

Scientific models structure our perception of reality. This paper studies how we choose among them under expert advice. Scientific models are formalised as probability distributions over possible scenarios. An expert is assumed to know the most likely model and seeks to communicate it to a...

We study perfect Bayesian equilibria of a sequential social learning model in which agents in a network learn about an underlying state by observing neighbors' choices. In contrast with prior work, we do not assume that the agents' sets of neighbors are mutually independent. We introduce a new...