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Pairing games and markets
Alkan, Ahmet; Tuncay, Alparslan - 2014
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
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Coalition formation in games with externalities
Montero, María - 2021
coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650908
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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games
Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889
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Chapter 55 Values of non-transferable utility games
McLean, Richard P. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2077-2120). 2002
This chapter surveys a class of solution concepts for n -person games without transferable utility — NTU games for short — that are based on varying notions of “fair division”. An NTU game is a specification of payoffs attainable by members of each coalition through some joint course of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024490
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Chapter 5. Coalition Formation
Ray, Debraj; Vohra, Rajiv - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 239-326). 2015
This chapter surveys a sizable and growing literature on coalition formation. We refer to theories in which one or more groups of agents (“coalitions”) deliberately get together to jointly determine within-group actions, while interacting noncooperatively across groups. The chapter describes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025454
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Credible Group Stability in Multi-Partner Matching Problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003
(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325144
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Credible group stability in multi-partner matching problems
Konishi, Hideo; Ünver, M. Utku - 2003
(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for …It is known that in two-sided many-to-many matching markets, pair-wise stability is not logically related with the …-partner matching problem that includes two-sided matching problems as special cases. Under the same preference restriction, we also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632
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Coalitional matchings
Dimitrov, Dinko; Lazarova, Emiliya - 2008
A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions … would like to learn from. In this setup, we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides … respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270953
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A Generalization of the Harsanyi NTU Value to Games with Incomplete Information
Salamanca, Andrés - 2018
In this paper, we introduce a solution concept generalizing the Harsanyi non-transferable utility (NTU) value to cooperative games with incomplete information. The so-defined S-solution is characterized by virtual utility scales that extend the Harsanyi-Shapley fictitious weighted utility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907407
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Externalities and Renegotiations in Three-Player Coalitional Bargaining
Gomes, Armando R. - 2004
This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems. The coalitional bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or unconditional offers, coalitions continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014035050