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We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011602849
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324949
We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We … consider three coalition games that allow for the formation of multiple coalitions. The coalition games represent different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014051299
We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029312
, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922042
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002154849
externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996131
increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352