We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …

We combine the newest concepts o non-cooperative coalition theory with a computable general equilibrium model close to … the seminal RICE-model of Nordhaus and Yang (1996) to determine stable coalition structures in a global warming game. We … consider three coalition games that allow for the formation of multiple coalitions. The coalition games represent different …

, then a non-winning coalition forms as an intermediate bargaining step and the final winning coalition is not necessarily …

international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a … climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is also taken into account. At the equilibrium, a coalition may emerge … despite the public good nature of climate. The size of the coalition depends on the degree of interdependence of countries …

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …