We study linearly weighted versions of the least core and the (pre)nucleolus and investigatethe reduction possibilities in their computation. We slightly extend some well-known related results and establish their counterparts by using the dual game. Our main results imply, for example, that if...

The article presents a solution of a problem that is critical from a practical point of view: how to share a higher than usual discount of $10 million among 5 importers. The discount is a result of forming a coalition by 5 current, formerly competing, importers. The use of Shapley value as a...

In a standard TU-game it is assumed that every subset of the player set can form a coalition and earn its worth. One of the first models where restrictions in cooperation are considered is the one of games with coalition structure. In such games the player set is partitioned into unions and...

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then...

A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in...

This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population...

In this paper we provide characterizations of convex games and total clan games by using properties of their corresponding marginal games. We show that a "dualize and restrict" procedure transforms total clan games with zero worth for the clan into monotonic convex games. Furthermore, each...